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Abstract. To mitigate pollution this note advocates a two-component
system. The polluter pays for the damage he causes and for the opportunity
to do so. The main motivation is to achieve Pareto e¢ ciency while avoiding
problems caused by asymmetric information and strategic moves. The proposed
regime induces each polluter to solve the same optimization problem as an
altruistic planner. Since the monetary burden of the scheme matches a linear
Pigouvian tax, it does not encourage ￿rms to split or merge.
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1. Introduction
Economic theory - and common sense - recommends that polluters better compen-
sate for damage in￿ icted on other agents. If emitting and receiving parties are easily
identi￿ed, together with corresponding amounts, one can, in principle, rectify choices
to become optimal. However, strategic moves, asymmetric information and measure-
ment problems all make the task of a regulating body hard indeed.
Yet, this note, while mute on measurement issues, advocates a system that does
well without access to private knowledge - and also relieves ￿rms from playing the
ground. It has two chief components: The ￿rst is a proportional tax, calibrated
by individual shares and by total damage. It is collected on the basis of the ￿rm￿ s
realized and observed emission, so total damage is calculated with the ￿rm itself as a
representative polluter of the industry. The second component is a separate payment
for the right to pollute, recorded as a share of the total emission.
With these two components in place, the resulting outcome is Pareto e¢ cient.
Each ￿rm can prudently act as if in a competitive situation, void of problems with
information and strategic choice. While taxation leads ￿rms to internalize environ-
mental costs, the market mechanism, being part of the scheme, ensures optimal distri-
bution of damage payments. Broadly, the components induce each and every polluter
to solve the same optimization problem as a benevolent, well-informed planner.
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The scheme is spelled out in Section 2. It di⁄ers in form from a full-information
Pigouvian tax, but complies in outcome because the resulting monetary burdens are
equivalent. This feature is at variance with the Kim and Chang (1993) proposal,
yielding a total tax burden below the Pigouvian level (McKitrick, 1999). Their pro-
posal is also Pareto e¢ cient, but it may encourage ￿rms to consolidate. We prove
this feature in Section 3, and demonstrate that our scheme has no such e⁄ect.
2. The individual transferable fee scheme
Fixed henceforth is a ￿nite set I of ￿rms. Agent i 2 I produces output xi ￿ 0
of one and the same commodity as the others. He sells this quantity in a common,
perfectly competitive market at ￿xed unit price p > 0. Production entails the emission
of a homogeneous pollutant dispersed into (local or global) commons. Firm i is
accountable for the emission level ei ￿ 0. Write e :=
P
ei as shorthand for the
aggregate emission level. Let economic damage d caused by emissions, as measured
in monetary terms, be given by
d = D(e) (1)
where, quite naturally, we posit that D(0) = 0, D0 > 0 and D00 > 0.
By assumption each and every ￿rm ignores the social costs of its emissions. It




where Ci is strictly convex and twice di⁄erentiable. A full-information welfare opti-






















for all i. Since the objective in problem (3) is strictly concave, conditions (4) and (5)
are also su¢ cient, and the optimum they determine is unique.
Clearly, ￿rm i￿ s ignorance of social costs implies that (5) be replaced by @Ci=@ei =
0. Plainly, the resulting ei is too large. Thus, there is a need, and ample justi￿cation,
for a regulator to intervene. We presume that such a central agent is bestowed with
the authority to implement an e¢ cient payment system of his own prudent design.
In that endeavour he must contend with knowing merely the damage function D(￿).
Private cost functions Ci are nonobservable, and so is maybe output xi as well. WeCircumventing Information and Incentive Problems in Pollution Control 3
posit though that he can observe ￿rm i￿ s emissions ei. Reasonably, we shall require
that every ￿rm be a pro￿t maximizing body, well informed about the data that
pertains directly to itself.
Interaction between the regulator and the ￿rm takes two forms. First, and right
away, ￿rm i is informed that it will be charged an individual tax
t






Here, as said, ei is the amount of pollutant emitted by the ￿rm i. We interpret the
entity si as ￿rm i￿ s share of total emission e. The reason for this name is that in the
￿nal round, si does indeed turn to be of that nature. Note that @ti=@ei = D0 (ei=si).
Since marginal damage D0(￿) increases with its argument ei=si, a higher si value for
the same ei means a lower marginal tax. So, a high si appears attractive to ￿rm i.
The second form of interaction, advocated here, relates to the fact that the equality P
si = 1 must be enforced somehow. Otherwise, talking or thinking about shares
makes no sense. To set things right we take an exchange market as appropriate
vehicle. Thus there should be a market-clearing price ￿ per unit of si, satisfying the
complementarity condition
X


















Assuming interior solutions to (8) the necessary condition with respect to xi conforms


























Proposition 1. Conditions (4), (9) and (10) are su¢ cient for an interior solution
of problem (8).
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that (ei;si) 7! siD(ei=si) is convex. For this purpose
recall that such convexity follows i⁄the Hessian of siD(ei=si) is positive semide￿nite











:Circumventing Information and Incentive Problems in Pollution Control 4





i D00(ei=si) are nonnegative. Finally, to complete the proof,
invoke the following (Sydsaeter and Hammond, 1995, Theorem 15.2b): A symmetric
matrix is positive semide￿nite i⁄ all eigenvalues are ￿ 0. ￿
Proposition 2. Suppose the constraint
P
si = 1 is enforced. Then si, i 2 I,




for all i: (11)
Proof. Equation (10) expresses ￿ by ei=si. Let the function G account for this
expression. That is, let ai := ei=si and posit
￿ = G(ai) := aiD
0 (ai) ￿ D(ai)
Note that G0 (ai) = aiD00 (ai) > 0, this telling that G is a strictly increasing function.
Hence, G is invertible and ai = G￿1(￿). So all ai are equal, and we are justi￿ed in
setting a := ai for all i 2 I. Moreover, a = ei=si implies ei = sia: Summing the last






and the desired assertion follows. ￿
The implication of (11) is that (5) is equivalent to (9) for all i. Hence, each ￿rm
solves the same problem as a seemingly well-informed socially planner. This implies
Proposition 3. The tax rule (6) and the enforcement of
P
si = 1 yield a so-
cially optimal level of output and pollution for all i. That is, the Nash solution is
Pareto e¢ cient. ￿
Note that (11) also implies
￿ = eD
0 (e) ￿ D(e); (12)
whence it follows
Proposition 4. For each ￿rm, the fee (6) plus expenses for si equals the tax the ￿rm
would face under full-information, Pigouvian unit tax ￿ := D0(e) determined by
T (ei;si) + ￿si = D
0 (e)ei = ￿ei: ￿ (13)
The overall scheme can thus be construed as a Pigouvian regime where ￿rms them-
selves choose the optimal emission and thereby also the optimal tax level. Since
the scheme relieves ￿rms from strategic considerations the Nash equilibrium, which
usually is not Pareto optimal, is indeed so here.
We call our construct the ￿ Individual Transferable Fee￿system, a name better
defended in Section 4. Before that, however, we brie￿ y address theCircumventing Information and Incentive Problems in Pollution Control 5
3. Tendency to merge or split
Given the aggregate emission e, Proposition 4 points to the linearity of taxes with
respect to individual pollution.
Proposition 5. As long as the total emission e is constant the above tax scheme
does not encourage ￿rms to merge or split. ￿
Kim and Chang (1993) proposed the following T K tax based on di⁄erential damage:
T
K (ei;e￿i) := D(e) ￿ D(e￿i): (14)




e ￿ ei ￿ 0 is the total amount emitted by all other ￿rms. Since D is strictly convex,
we deduce
Proposition 6. Assume constant total emission e. The ￿incremental damage
scheme￿encourages ￿rms to consolidate.
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that any pair of ￿rms pays less tax by consolidating
than what they do individually. Consider a pair where the ￿rm i, which is not the
heaviest polluter of those two, emits quantity ei > 0. The other ￿rm emits the quan-
tity ei +r, where r ￿ 0. With e > 0 constant, the di⁄erence ￿(ei;r) of the sum paid
by the two ￿rms individually over a consolidated company is
￿(ei;r) := T
K (ei;e ￿ ei) + T
K (ei + r;e ￿ ei ￿ r) ￿ T
K (2ei + r;e ￿ 2ei ￿ r)
where the function ￿ has domain f(ei;r) : 0 < ei ￿ e;0 ￿ r ￿ e ￿ 2eig. Inserting (14)
and simplifying yields





0 (e ￿ ei ￿ r) ￿ D





0 (e ￿ ei) ￿ D
0 (e ￿ 2ei ￿ r)] + [D
0 (e ￿ ei ￿ r) ￿ D
0 (e ￿ 2ei ￿ r)] > 0:
This follows from D0 being increasing, and the argument of the positive D0 is higher
than for the negative D0 in all segments separated by square brackets. The result
lim
ei!0￿(ei;0) = 0
and the fact that ￿ increases in both its arguments ensures that ￿(ei;r) > 0 within
its domain. This proves that each ￿rm pays less tax by consolidating with another
company. Hence, a tendency to merge is present. ￿Circumventing Information and Incentive Problems in Pollution Control 6
4. Concluding remarks
This paper introduces a two-component payment system for the purpose of pollution
control. When individual emissions can be observed and markets for emission rights
are fully competitive, the regulator can induce ￿rst best optimum by knowing merely
the marginal damage function.
We call our construct the Individual Transferable Fee system. It is ￿ individual￿
because each ￿rm pays according to its own emission. It is ￿ transferable￿because
shares are traded on a market.
Note that while the proposed scheme is nonlinear, the total monetary burden
equals that caused by a linear Pigouvian tax. The latter feature ensures that the
scheme does not encourage restructuring of industry in the form of mergers or splits.
Providing such restructuring is deemed undesirable, our proposal seems superior to
the scheme advocated by Kim and Chang (1993).
Individual Transferable Fees can be interpreted as a system that blends linear
taxation with quantity instruments. To envision this analogy, consider the mixed
system of tradable quantities and linear taxation proposed by Robert and Spence
(1979). For their proposal to work, the damage function is approximated with a one-
step function consisting of two piecewise linear segments. In the appendix of their
article, they recommend approximating the damage function better by using several
such steps. However, as Baumol and Oates (1988, page 77) note: ￿ In the limit, when
the number of steps goes to in￿nity, we would, of course, have the variable fee system
we described earlier and which produces the optimal outcome￿ . What they described
earlier (page 76), and called for, was a variable fee system that has precisely the
characteristics of our Individual Transferable Fee proposal.
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